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Abstract
Renegotiation of contractual agreements may lead to distortion of ex-ante incen-
tives and inefficiencies. We examine the conditions under which this problem
can be circumvented in a credible way by the use of financial claims. We show
that if the contracting parties do not know exactly how many claims have been
issued or who hold them then they are unwilling to participate in any renego-
tiation attempt and renegotiation blocking is successful. We also show that if
court hearings are open to public then one can design the claims so that hidden
side-contracting never takes place. Moreover, this renegotiation blocking process
does not generate additional inefficiencies.
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1 Introduction
Renegotiation is an important constraint on the design of contracts. Some contracts,
even though they may be ex-ante efficient, are not ex-post efficient and, therefore,
they are renegotiated. As a result, a contract which is not renegotiation-proof is not
credible, as it can not survive ex-post renegotiation. Thus, renegotiation-proofness is
an additional constraint on contract/mechanism design. Moreover, the expectation
of renegotiation may distort ex-ante incentives or tighten the incentive-compatibility
constraints of some agents, which leads to inefficiencies.
Despite the presence of several papers that examine the conditions under which a
contract or a mechanism is renegotiation-proof, (Dewatripont, 1988; Hart and Tirole,
1988; Beaudry and Poitevin, 1995; Maskin and Moore, 1999; Bester and Strausz, 2001),
whether renegotiation can be credibly blocked, has received little attention in terms of
formal models.
For example, Maskin and Moore (1999) propose third party payments and Maskin
and Tirole (1999) propose lotteries as possible solutions to renegotiation but they do not
formalize their arguments. Moreover it is not clear if these solutions work as they may
be vulnerable to collusion with the third party or they may be circumvented through
hidden side contracting (Hart and Moore, 1999).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formal treatment of renegotiation blocking
through the use of financial claims, which give the right to the bearer to ask compen-
sation from the contracting parties if renegotiation occurs (payments to claim holders).
Moreover, we show that whether renegotiation can be effectively blocked or not depends
crucially on the information that the contracting parties have regarding the claims. If
the parties know how many claims have been issued then claims cannot block renegoti-
ation and the suggestion of Hart and Moore (1999) applies. However, if parties do not
know how many claims have been issued and who holds them then renegotiation can
be effectively blocked.
For the intuition behind this result, note that renegotiation can take place only if
the financial claims linked to it are “nullified” by the contracting parties. Since the
parties do not know who hold them, they can only make a public tender offer (i.e.
publicly announce a price for each tendered claim). Once all claims are tendered,
the contracting parties can tear them and go ahead with renegotiation. But since the
contracting parties are never sure if all the claims have been tendered, they are sceptical
about renegotiation and the process breaks down.
We show this result under two different assumption regarding the timing of events.
In section 3.2 we examine the case where the contracting parties decide on renegoti-
ation at the same time as the external claim holders decide whether to tender their
claims or not. Since actions take place simultaneously, this case is modelled as a game
of imperfect information. We show that “simple” financial claims, which give the right
to the claim holder to demand a compensation at the event of renegotiation, are suf-
ficient to block renegotiation. Indeed, we prove that the contracting parties’ expected
payoff is maximized when they set the tender price equal to zero, which makes ex-post
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renegotiation happen with zero probability.
In section 3.3 we examine the case where claim holders tender their claims before
the contracting parties decide on renegotiation. In this case, the contracting parties
condition their decision on the number of tendered claims. This situation is better
described by a game of incomplete information where claim holders need to be provided
with appropriate incentives in order to reveal their information (i.e. whether they hold
a claim). Therefore, it is more appropriate to adopt a mechanism design approach and
consider general “mechanisms” as a bargaining tool between the contracting parties
and claim holders. Nonetheless, we show that the claims can be designed at the ex-ante
stage to block any such mechanism. “Complex” claims, whose value depends not only
on the renegotiation between the parties, but also on the participation decision of other
claim holders in the mechanism can eliminate any incentive to participate in it along
with the prospects of renegotiation.
Finally, section 4 formalizes the case where the contracting parties can engage in
hidden renegotiation attempts which may involve side-contracts with multiple third
parties. We show that as long as court hearings are open to the public, so that the
claim holders can find out that there is a trial involving the contracting parties, then
any hidden contract/mechanism can be rendered non-enforceable. This is because at
least one party prefers to renege on her promise and to not fulfil the terms of the hidden
contract, while her counter-parties do not take her to courts under the fear of the claims
being exercised.
One may ask how is it possible that neither contracting party knows how many
claims have been issued or who holds them. Several possible interpretations can be
given. One possibility is to think that financial institutions offer this service to con-
tracting parties for a fee: they issue a random number of claims and they distribute
them through anonymous transactions in financial markets to claim holders. Moreover,
the fear of losing their reputation prevents these institutions from revealing to their
clients (the contracting parties) how many claims have been issued once the latter want
to renegotiate.
A simpler interpretation is to think that the contracting parties originally issue a
large number of claims in physical form and then one of them grabs randomly some
claims from the pile and destroys them (without counting). Then they distribute the
remaining claims by handing them out to people in a marketplace.1 In order to make
the game description as simple as possible we adopt this interpretation.
Nonetheless, regardless of which interpretation is adopted, the main contribution of
the paper is rather theoretical. If renegotiation generates substantial inefficiencies and
renegotiation parties want to block it, then, in principle, they should be able to do so.
Indeed, financial claims is a possible way they can achieve this.
Our paper is closely related to Evans (2012), who examines the issue of renegoti-
ation in mechanism design when messages are costly. Evans (2012) shows that any
1Other interpretations may involve programming a software to print a random number claims or
throwing them off a plane.
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Pareto-efficient social choice function can be implemented by a renegotiation-proof
mechanism if message costs are strictly positive, even though possibly very small.
We adopt a different approach. We allow for messages to be costless and we achieve
renegotiation-proofness through the friction of endogenously generated asymmetric in-
formation. Moreover, we allow for quasi-concave payoff functions, while Evans (2012)
restricts analysis to separable payoffs.
Watson (2007) shows that the set of implementable payoffs in mechanism design
when renegotiation is possible depends on the technology of trade and the time that
renegotiation takes place. When renegotiation takes place before sending messages to
the designer, public action models and individual action models are equivalent. How-
ever, if renegotiation takes place after sending messages to the designer then individual
action models can implement a wider set of payoffs than public action models.
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009) show that contracting with third-parties can be used to
implement first-best outcomes in hold-up and moral-hazard-in-teams problems despite
the possibility of hidden side-contracting. Their results hold as long as side-contracting
and the original agreement are modelled in a symmetric manner, in the sense that if the
side-contracts specify secret messages and cash transfers, then the original agreement
should be allowed to do so as well. On the other hand, we show how hidden side-
contracting can be blocked if court hearings are public information (i.e. open to public).
The impact of renegotiation on contract design and efficiency has been examined in
several fields: in the literature of short-term contracts (Dewatripont, 1989; Laffont and
Tirole, 1990; Fudenberg, Holmstrom, and Milgrom, 1990; Rey and Salanie´, 1996), in
the literature of strategic delegation and third-party contracting (Katz, 1991; Bensaid
and Gary-Bobo, 1993; Caillaud, Jullien, and Picard, 1995; Bester and Sakovics, 2001;
Gerratana and Koc¸kesen, 2012b,a), in mechanism design (Rubinstein and Wolinsky,
1992; Maskin and Moore, 1999; Segal and Whinston, 2002; Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002;
Neeman and Pavlov, 2010; Brennan and Watson, 2013), in repeated games (Farrell and
Maskin, 1989; Evans and Maskin, 1989; Bernheim and Ray, 1989; Asheim, 1991), in
the hold-up literature (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1994; Maskin and Tirole, 1999;
Hart and Moore, 1999), in financial contracts (Snyder, 1996; Hart and Moore, 1998;
Matthews, 2001). However, these papers do not examine if and how renegotiation can
be blocked.
Nonetheless, previous papers have pointed-out that information asymmetries at the
renegotiation stage may reduce the probability of renegotiation or block it completely.
For example, Dewatripont (1988) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1990) show how parties
may want to maintain information asymmetries in order to prevent future renegotiation
even though information sharing may be costless. A similar argument is presented by
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990). But the solutions of these papers are not general, as they
take the information structure as given and, hence, they depend on the specifics of the
economic problem at hand. Moreover, the introduction of information asymmetry in
these models facilitates renegotiation-blocking, but it increases the inefficiency caused
due to informational rents.
On the other hand this paper presents a simple and credible way to block renego-
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tiation independently of the reason that contracting parties find ex-post renegotiation
beneficial. This is because it is based on asymmetric information only about the claims
that block renegotiation themselves and not on the economic primitives. In other
words, the source of renegotiation does not matter. Whether renegotiation is due to in-
formation revelation over time (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1990; Ma, 1991), irreversibilities
(Dewatripont and Maskin, 1990), ex-post suboptimal punishments (Maskin and Tirole,
1999) or even time inconsistent preferences (something which is not usually assumed in
contract theory) is irrelevant.
For the same reason, the proposed solution does not interact with the other incen-
tive compatibility constraints of the problem at hand, meaning that no additional inef-
ficiency is caused by it. It only supports the credibility of the ex-ante optimal contracts.
That is, whenever the proposed solution is adopted, an ex-ante Pareto improvement is
achieved.
In the following sections, we present these arguments in a formal manner. Section
2 presents the basic model and the main assumptions. Section 3.1 considers the case
of complete information, when the contracting parties know the exact number of claim
holders. Section 3.2 shows how financial claims can be used to block renegotiation in
the case of imperfect information and 3.3 examines the case of incomplete information.
Section 4 considers the case where hidden side-contracting is possible and section 5
discusses how the model can be modified to accommodate for other sources of renego-
tiation. Finally, section 6 provides a discussion on the assumptions of limited liability
and issuance costs and concludes.
2 The Problem
In order to keep the analysis concrete, let us examine the case of two contracting parties
who may want to renegotiate their original contract because of information revelation
reasons (realization of an observable and verifiable state of the world). However, section
5 shows how the framework can be adopted to encompass other sources of renegotiation.
Also the analysis can be extended to multiple contracting parties.
At t = 0 two contracting parties, i and j, agree on a contract κα, which defines a
vector of verifiable actions x(s) = (xi(s), xj(s)) and the final allocation of a transferable
resource m(s) = (mi(s),mj(s)) (“money”) as a function of a yet unrealized state of
nature s and which are to take place at t = 4. Formally, κα = (xα(s),mα(s)).
Given the contract, the two parties undertake some non-contractible (i.e. non-
verifiable or unobservable) actions y = (yi, yj) at time t = 1. At t = 2 the state s is
revealed to the parties, who, in light of this new information, may want to renegotiate
the original contract to κpi at t = 3: κpi(s) = (xpi(s),mpi(s)). Therefore, κpi defines a new
vector of verifiable actions and transfers to be executed given state s at t = 4 instead
of the original contract κα. Finally, at t = 4, the contract is executed (κα if there is no
renegotiation, κpi if there is renegotiation) and payoffs are realized. The diagram below
summarizes the timing of events.
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
For a contracting party p (p ∈ {i, j}) the payoff is a quasi-concave function of the
vector of actions (x, y), of its final allocation of “money” mp and of the realized state s:
up(x,mp, y; s). At t = 4, p’s ex-post payoff, conditional on state s and the undertaken
actions y, is up(x,mp|y, s), while its expected payoff at t = 0 is Up = Es[up(x,mp, y; s)].
Let κ∗ = (x∗(s),m∗(s)) be the ex-ante optimal contract that the two parties would
agree to implement if renegotiation was impossible (case of full commitment), and let
y∗(κ∗) be the optimal non-verifiable actions that they would undertake at t = 1 if they
expected κ∗ to be implemented at t = 4. That is (κ∗, y∗(κ∗)) maximize the expected
welfare of the two contracting parties, i.e. they reach a point at their ex-ante Pareto
frontier.
Next, given a realized state s at t = 2, let κ(s) = (x(s),m(s)) be the ex-post optimal
contract that the two parties would like to implement at t = 3 in light of the revealed
information regarding the state, and let y(κ) be the optimal non-verifiable actions at
t = 1 given that they are expected to choose the ex-post optimal contract κ in every
state s. In other words, whereas y∗(κ∗) is the optimal actions under full commitment
on the initial contract κ∗, y(κ) denotes the vector of optimal actions when the parties
rationally anticipate the outcome of renegotiation at t = 3.
Given the above, we make the following main assumptions:
• A.1: The ex-ante optimal contract κ∗ is not renegotiation-proof, i.e.
there exists some state s and a contract κ such that:
up(x(s),mp(s)|y, s) > up(x∗(s),m∗p(s)|y, s) ∀ p ∈ {i, j}.
• A.2: The anticipation of renegotiation destroys incentives, so that the
expected utility decreases for both agents:
Es[up(x(s),mp(s), y(κ); s)] < Es[up(x
∗(s),m∗p(s), y
∗(κ∗); s)] ∀ p ∈ {i, j}
In other words, the ex-post optimal contract is not ex-ante optimal. At time zero,
both parties would prefer that they stick to contract κ∗ ex-post, even though they know
that this is time-inconsistent. The loss of efficiency is caused by the impact of the ex-
post allocation (effectively the ex-post contract κ) on the choice of optimal actions y(κ)
at t = 1.
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Note that the non-verifiability of the actions y is not a crucial assumption. Even
if they were verifiable, the same problem could arise if, for example, preferences were
time-varying/dependent so that the ex-ante optimal contract does not remain optimal
ex-post. Also, the same problem may arise due to the interaction of moral-hazard
with irreversibilities, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1990), Ma (1991) and the soft-budget
constraints literature (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland, 2003). Even in mechanism design,
some mechanisms may not be renegotiation-proof, if they impose ex-post suboptimal
allocations (Maskin and Tirole, 1999). Renegotiation-proof mechanisms, however, may
reduce the set of implementable allocations or they may be ex-ante sub-optimal. The
arguments put forward in the next sections work for all these cases as long as the
assumptions A.1 and A.2 above apply.
3 A Simple Solution
3.1 Financial Claims to Block Renegotiation and the Case of
Complete Information
The main result of the paper is that contract renegotiation can be blocked by issuing
financial claims, which give the right to the bearer (the claim holder) to receive a
compensation if renegotiation takes place. This result obtains as long as the total
number of claims issued is unknown to the contracting parties. As a benchmark, and
in order to show how asymmetric information is important for the result, we start from
the case where the two parties know exactly how many claims have been issued.
More specifically, suppose that at t0−, just before signing the contract κα, i and j
try to block future renegotiation by issuing a number n of financial claims, which are
redeemable in the event of renegotiation. This means that if i and j renegotiate the
original contract κα, then the claim holders are entitled to a compensation C for each
one of the claims they hold.
It is assumed that C is large enough so that at least one of the two parties prefers to
execute the ex-ante optimal contract over renegotiation. This means that, given some
exogenous weights βi and βj which are used to split the total payment that the parties
make to the claim holders, C is large enough so that one of them would rather avoid
renegotiation. Formally, let βp be the share of the total payment to claim holders that
party p pays ex-post and let βi + βj = 1.
2 Then we have the following assumption:
• A.3: There exists C large enough such that, for any {βi, βj|βi + βj = 1},
up(x
∗(s),m∗p(s)|y, s) > up(x(s),mp(s)− βpC|y, s) for some p ∈ {i, j}
Under assumption A.3, even if only one claim is expected to be exercised, the
payment C is sufficiently high to deter at least one of the parties from agreeing to
renegotiate.
2Thus, βp reflects the ex-post bargaining power of party p. The higher βp is, the higher share of
any payment she agrees to pay and hence the lower her bargaining power.
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However, under complete information, i and j know that the total claims issued are
n. If at t = 2, state s is revealed and both of them would like to renegotiate in this
state, then at t2+, just after the state is revealed, they can make a public tender offer
to the claim holders, exchanging each tendered claim for a small price q.
Even though q may be close to zero, the best-response for each one of the claim
holders is to tender her claims. This is because, even if a single claim is not tendered,
renegotiation will not take place at t = 3 and the claims are valueless. Any proposed
price q > 0 is worth more than each of the claims. This means that i and j can reap
almost all of the benefit of renegotiation ex-post, which is, of course, anticipated at
t = 1. This implies that ex-ante sub-optimal actions are undertaken and hence the
failure of claims to block renegotiation.3
3.2 Simple Claims and Imperfect Information
We now examine how the results change if neither i or j know exactly how many claims
have been issued. In particular we show that if i and j make their decision to renegotiate
at the same time as the claim holders make their decision to tender the claims, then the
only possible equilibrium is for the two parties to not renegotiate the ex-ante contract,
even though they have the option of a public tender offer.
In order to keep the description of the game as simple as possible, the following
justification for the missing information is adopted: the contracting parties originally
issue a large number of claims (N), then one of them grabs randomly some claims and
destroys them and then they distribute the remaining ones to a large crowd. This avoids
the strategic complications arising from assuming that they delegate these decisions to
a financial firm. In any case, n, the total number of distributed claims, is now a random
variable, which we assume to take values from n to n, with n ≤ N and n ≥ 0. f(n) is
the probability that the number of distributed claims is equal to n.
In addition to A.3, we assume that one of the two contracting parties, say party i,
finds renegotiation less beneficial than the other party whenever it believes that some
claims are not tendered. Formally, let k be the total number of claims that the parties
believe that are tendered and let n be the total number of claims that the parties believe
that are distributed. We make the following assumption.
• A.4: For any value of q, k, n:
ui(x
∗(s),m∗i (s)− βikq|y, s)− ui(x(s),mi(s)− βikq − βi(n− k)C|y, s) >
uj(x
∗(s),m∗j(s)− βjkq|y, s)− uj(x(s),mj(s)− βjkq − βj(n− k)C|y, s)
In A.4, m∗i (s) − βikq is i’s final endowment in terms of money if there is no rene-
gotiation and it makes a payment equal to βikq to claim holders, while mi(s)− βikq −
βi(n− k)C is its final endowment if renegotiate takes place, in which case i expects to
pay βikq in total for the tendered claims and βi(n− k)C in total for the non-tendered
claims. The same interpretation applies to j. Thus A.4 states that i benefits more
3This case is also discussed in Maskin and Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999)
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from blocking renegotiation than j and hence i is less likely to renegotiate. This allows
us to focus the analysis on i, since if i is willing to renegotiate then j is also willing to
do so.
We assume that i sets q at t2+, since it has the smallest willingness to renegotiate.
Note that A.4 is without loss of generality. If we assume instead that both i and j
are equally likely to block renegotiation (A.4 holds with equality), then both of them
receive the same expected gain from their decision to renegotiate and so analysing the
case of one of the two also gives us the analysis for the other. Finally, in order to
simplify the notation in the analysis that follows, we suppress arguments y and s in up.
The timing of events is the same as in 3.1. That is, at t0−, i and j issue and distribute
n financial claims against renegotiation, with the realization of n being unknown to
them or to the claim holders. The claims are given out for free. The claim holders are
identical in terms of their characteristics and each one holds a single claim. At t = 0, i
and j sign the contract κα, at t = 1 they undertake actions yi, yj and at t = 2 the state
of nature is revealed. After this, at t2+, the contracting parties, if they know that they
are in a state that renegotiation is valuable, they make a public offer to claim holders
to tender their claims in exchange for q units of “money” for each claim, where q is
set by i (i.e. the party with the least willingness to renegotiate). At t = 3 the claim
holders observe the tender offer and decide to tender their claims or not and i and j
decide whether to renegotiate κα or not. Any non-tendered claim is exercised after this,
at t3+, and contracts are executed and final payoffs are realized at t = 4. This is also
shown on the figure below.
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Figure 2: Timing of Events
Note that because the contracting parties decide on renegotiation at the same time
as the claim holders decide whether to tender their claims, the game is one of imperfect
information. Therefore we adopt Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for this sub-
section. We prove our claim by first examining the case where the two parties choose
to set the price of a tendered claim equal to zero, which is effectively the case when
no tender offer is made. Then we examine the case where the tender price is strictly
positive and finally we show that setting the price equal to zero is optimal for the parties.
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We now prove the main claim. First, at t2+ the two parties would never set the
tender price q at a level higher than or equal to C, since, by assumption A.3, they
would rather set q = 0, renegotiate and pay C for each claim than gathering all claims
for a price q ≥ C and then renegotiating. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to the case
where 0 ≤ q < C.
At t3+, if renegotiation does not take place, then the claims are valueless and whether
they are exercised or not does not change payoffs. While if renegotiation takes place,
each claim is worth C and all non-tendered claims are exercised. Therefore, the in-
teresting interactions happen at t = 3, when i, j and the claim holders decide their
respective strategies.
Let ρi (ρj) be the probability with which i (j) agrees to renegotiate at t = 3.
Since renegotiation is only possible when both parties agree on it, the probability of
renegotiation is ρ ≡ ρiρj. Also, let τ be the probability that a claim holder tenders
her claim and let k be the total number of claims tendered. Since neither i or j or
the claim holders know n, their strategies ρi, ρj and τ are independent of n and since
actions are taken simultaneously ρi and ρj are independent of k. Also, each claim
holder’s payoff depends only on the total probability of renegotiation ρ, so her strategy
τ is independent of the strategy of the other claim holders.
For a claim holder l, if she tenders her claim, she receives the price q and her utility
is simply ul(ml + q), where ml is l’s endowment of “money”. Note that claim holders
receive no benefit or suffer no disutility from the contracts that i and j sign, so their
payoff depends only on their final endowment of the transferable resource. If l does
not tender, then with probability ρ there is renegotiation, in which case she exercises
the claim and receives C, and with probability 1− ρ there is no renegotiation and the
claim is worthless, so her utility is ul(ml). Therefore, her expected utility in this case
is Ul(τ = 1) = ρul(ml +C) + (1− ρ)ul(ml). So, l tenders only if ρ ≤ ul(ml+q)−ul(ml)ul(ml+C)−ul(ml) and
does not tender otherwise.
Similarly, we define the payoffs for i and j. For party i, if she decides not to renego-
tiate, then renegotiation is blocked and her payoff is given by the following expression,
where we have suppressed arguments y and s in ui to simplify the notation:
Ui(ρi = 0, ρj) =
n∑
k=0
ui(x
∗,m∗i − βikq)µ(k, τ) (1)
where µ(k, τ) ≡
n∑
n=max{k,n}
(
n
k
)
τ k(1− τ)n−kf(n)
In (1), ui(x
∗,m∗i − βikq) is i’s utility when the original, ex-ante optimal contract
(x∗(s),m∗(s)) is not renegotiated, k claims are tendered and i pays out fraction βi of
the total payment kq to claim holders. µ(k, τ) is the probability that exactly k claims
are tendered conditional on each claim holder tendering her claim with probability τ .
On the other hand, if i chooses to renegotiate, her payoff also depends on the choice
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of j. j does not renegotiate with probability 1 − ρj and i’s payoff is as in (1), while j
renegotiates with probability ρj and i’s payoff is then given by:
n∑
k=n
ui(x,mi − βikq)τ kf(k)
+
n∑
k=0
n∑
n=max{k+1,n}
λ(k, n, τ)ui [x,mi − βikq − βi(n− k)C] (2)
where λ(k, n, τ) ≡
(
n
k
)
τ k(1− τ)n−kf(n)
In (2), τ kf(k) is the probability that all claims are tendered, given the claim hold-
ers’ strategy τ . In this case there are no outstanding claims after renegotiation, the
renegotiated contract (x(s),m(s)) is executed, and i’s share of payment is βikq. On
the other hand, with probability λ(k, n, τ) exactly k out of n claim holders tender their
claims, with k < n, in which case (x(s),m(s)) is executed, and i pays out share βi of the
total payment kq + (n − k)C. Overall, i’s payoff of renegotiation when j renegotiates
with probability ρj is equal to:
Ui(ρi = 1, ρj) = (1− ρj)
n∑
k=0
ui(x
∗,m∗i − βikq)µ(k, τ) + ρj
n∑
k=n
ui(x,mi − βikq)τ kf(k)
+ ρj
n∑
k=0
n∑
n=max{k+1,n}
λ(k, n, τ)ui [x,mi − βikq − βi(n− k)C] (3)
Therefore, i renegotiates with probability one only if (3) > (1). This means that i
renegotiates only if ρjA > 0, where A is the expression given by equation (4) below.
A ≡
n∑
k=n
ui(x,mi−βikq)τ kf(k)+
n∑
k=0
n∑
n=max{k+1,n}
λ(k, n, τ)ui [x,mi − βikq − βi(n− k)C]
−
n∑
k=0
ui(x
∗,m∗i − βikq)µ(k, τ) > 0 (4)
So, if ρj > 0, then i renegotiates with probability one when A > 0. However, if
ρj = 0, then i’s payoff is independent of her choice which implies that ρi ∈ [0, 1]. Simi-
larly for j, if ρi > 0, j renegotiates with probability one if B > 0, where B is given by
equation (5) below.
B ≡
n∑
k=n
uj(x,mj−βjkq)τ kf(k)+
n∑
k=0
n∑
n=max{k+1,n}
λ(k, n, τ)uj [x,mj − βjkq − βj(n− k)C]
−
n∑
k=0
uj(x
∗,m∗j − βjkq)µ(k, τ) (5)
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While if ρi = 0, then j’s payoff is independent of her strategy and ρj ∈ [0, 1]. The
above analysis of the best-responses of the two parties indicates that it is possible to
have an equilibrium where ρi = ρj = 0 due to coordination failure. This is because
renegotiation requires coordination between the two parties, which generates comple-
mentarity is their choice, so that one examines the value of renegotiation only if it
believes that the other will also do so.
Formally, suppose that 0 < q < C and consider the case where ρi = ρj = 0 and
τ = 1. This is an equilibrium of the subgame that starts at t = 3 even though all claim
holders always tender their claims. This is because even if one party, say i, were to
choose ρi > 0, the other one blocks renegotiation, so ρi = 0 remains a best-response.
And because ρiρj = 0 and q > 0, the claim holders’ best-response is τ = 1. On the
other hand, ρi = ρj = 0 and τ < 1 is not an equilibrium, because the claim holders’ best
response is to tender with probability one if ρ = 0. It is easy to check that the same
argument holds when q = 0. The only difference is that claim holders are indifferent
between tendering their claims or not when q = 0, and so τ ∈ [0, 1]. We summarize
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Coordination failure equilibrium) If condition A.3 holds for both i
and j then the subgame that starts at t = 3 has an equilibrium where ρi = ρj = 0 ,
τ = 1, if q > 0, and ρi = ρj = 0 , τ ∈ [0, 1], if q = 0.
The above equilibrium is not very interesting for the purposes of this paper because
renegotiation is merely blocked by the inability of the contracting parties to coordinate
their actions. It is also unstable in the sense that it does not survive the refinement
of trembling hand equilibrium. Therefore, we ignore it for the remainder of the analysis.
Having analysed the best-response functions of the parties and the claim holders
and the possibility of coordination failure, we return to the analysis of other equilibria
under the case of q = 0. In this case, because ρul(ml +C) + (1− ρ)ul(ml) ≥ ul(ml) for
any ρ ∈ [0, 1], the claim holders always prefer to not tender their claims, apart from the
case where ρ = 0, in which case they are indifferent and τ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for any
ρ > 0, the best-response for l is to set τ = 0. However, if τ = 0 then k = 0 and then,
due to A.3, either A < 0 or B < 0, so at least one of the two parties’ best-response
is to block renegotiation by setting ρp = 0. In other words, if q = 0 then there cannot
exist an equilibrium of the subgame with ρ > 0.
If ρ = 0 then l is indifferent between her actions and so τ ∈ [0, 1]. However, for
this to be an equilibrium it must also be the case that it is a best-response for i or
j to set ρi = 0 or ρj = 0. This requires that either A < 0 or B < 0. To find
the values of τ consistent with this requirement, let us first define the values of τ
such that i is indifferent between renegotiating or not by defining the following set:
T i0 = {τ |A < 0, q = 0}. T i0 is non-empty. To see this, note that:
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lim
τ→0
A =
n∑
n=n
ui (x,mi − βinC) f(n)− ui(x∗,m∗i ) < 0
The above expression is negative when τ → 0, because, by A.4, A < B and, by
A.3, at least one of the expressions A and B is negative. On the other hand:
lim
τ→0
A = ui (x,mi)− ui(x∗,m∗i ) > 0
The above expression is positive when τ → 1 by A.1. Since A is a continuous func-
tion of τ , there must exist τ i0 ∈ (0, 1) such that A = 0, so T i0 is non-empty. Moreover,
when q = 0, A is strictly increasing in τ so the cut-off value τ i0 is unique. This implies
that for any τ ∈ [0, τ i0], A < 0, ρ = 0 and the requirement for equilibrium is satisfied.
Additionally, since ρi = 0, j’s payoff if independent of its decision ρj, so ρj ∈ [0, 1]. We
summarize this result in the the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If q = 0 the only possible equilibria of the subgame that starts at t = 3
is the ones where ρi = 0 (no renegotiation), ρj ∈ [0, 1] and τ ∈ [0, τ i0]. i’s equilibrium
payoff is ui(x
∗,m∗i ).
Note that equilibria with ρj = 0 and ρi > 0 are not possible due to A.4, which implies
that, if τ j0 exists, then τ j0 < τ i0, so if ρj = 0 then ρi = 0 as well.
Next, we let q > 0 and we examine the equilibria of the subgame that starts at
t = 3. The first result is that the subgame has no equilibrium in pure strategies.
To see this suppose that claim holders tender with probability one. Then τ = 1,
µ(k, τ = 1) = f(k) and λ(k, n, τ = 1) = 0. This implies that i’s and j’s expected
payments are independent of their decision to renegotiate, and because, by definition,
(x,m) provides higher utility to both than (x∗,m∗), we have that A > 0 and B > 0.
Therefore, if τ = 1 then ρi = 1 and ρj = 1. However, if ρ = 1 then l’s best-response is
to not tender, since ul(ml + C) > ul(ml + q).
Similarly, if the claim holders never tender (τ = 0), then k = 0 and both A < 0
and B < 0. Therefore, i and j prefer to block renegotiation: ρ = 0. However, if ρ = 0
then ul(ml + q) > ul(ml), so l prefers to tender: τ = 1. We present this result in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 If q > 0, there is no equilibrium with τ = 0 or τ = 1 in the subgame
that starts at t = 3.
Therefore, if q > 0 the only possible equilibria of the game are mixed strategy, where τ ∈
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(0, 1), which implies that i is indifferent between renegotiating or not and claim holders
are indifferent between tendering their claims or not. For l to be indifferent between
tendering the claim or not it must be that ul(ml + q) = ρul(ml + C) + (1 − ρ)ul(ml)
and so we have the following critical value for ρ:
ρ ≡ ul(ml + q)− ul(ml)
ρul(ml + C)− ul(ml) (6)
Similarly, for i to be indifferent between renegotiating or not τ must be such that
A = 0. Similarly to the case where q = 0, let T i = {τ |A = 0, q > 0}. T i is non-empty.
To see this, note that:
lim
τ→0
A =
n∑
n=n
ui (x,mi − βinC) f(n)− ui(x∗,m∗i ) < 0
On the other hand:
lim
τ→1
A =
n∑
n=n
ui (x,mi − βinq) f(n)−
n∑
n=n
ui(x
∗,m∗i − βinq)f(n) > 0
Since A is a continuous function of τ , there exists τ i ∈ (0, 1) such that A = 0.
Moreover, by assumption A.4, if A = 0 then B > 0 and j’s best response is ρj = 1.
Therefore, any τ ∈ T i, ρi = ρ, ρj = 1 is a mixed strategy equilibrium of the subgame.
Moreover, it is impossible to have a mixed strategy equilibrium with ρj < 1 and ρi > ρ,
because this would require A = B = 0, which is incompatible with A.4. We summarize
this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If q > 0, the subgame that starts at t = 3 has only mixed strategy
equilibria, with equilibrium strategies (ρi = ρ, ρj = 1, τ i), with ρ given by (6) and
τ i ∈ T i.
In proposition 4 the overall probability of renegotiation ρ is equal to ρ. And because i
is indifferent between renegotiating or not, its equilibrium payoff is given by either (1)
or (3). Hence, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 If q > 0 then at t = 3 i’s subgame equilibrium payoff is given by:
U∗i =
n∑
k=0
ui(x
∗,m∗i − βikq)µ(k, τ) (7)
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As the proposition 2 verifies, corollary 1 also applies to the limit case where q = 0.
The next step is to examine the optimal price of the tender offer at t2+. At this
point i chooses q to maximize its utility. And irrespectively of the value of βi, (7) is
maximized for q = 0.4 Since the optimal price at t2+ is zero, then proposition 2 applies
and we have the following result.
Proposition 5 At t2+ i sets q = 0. The equilibrium probability of renegotiation is
ρ = 0 and the probability of a claim holder tendering is τ ∈ [0, τ i0], with 0 < τ i0 < 1.
Since contracting parties anticipate the equilibrium of the subgame at t2+, they take
the optimal actions y∗ at t = 1, sign the optimal contract κ∗ at t = 0 and they choose
to issue the claims at t0−.
Overall, the result changes dramatically between the case of section 3.1 and the
game of this section. In the former case renegotiation always takes place while in the
latter case it never takes place. i strictly prefer to set q = 0 (effectively, not to make a
tender offer) and stick with the original contract than to set q > 0. This is because claim
holders do not always tender their claims if q > 0 and so the benefits of renegotiation
do not exceed the cost of the tender offer. Of course, the result depends on the fact
that the actions of contracting parties and the claim holders are taken simultaneously
and that i determines q. In the next section we show how complex claims can be used
to block any renegotiation attempt when these assumptions are relaxed.
3.3 Complex Claims and Incomplete Information
We now examine the case where the claim holders are allowed to move before the
contracting parties make their final decision on renegotiation. In fact, we allow for a
more general bargaining game (a “mechanism”) between the contracting parties and
the claim holders after the state of the world is revealed. We also allow the mechanism
to renegotiate the terms of the claims themselves. Moreover, assumption A.4 is not
required for the purposes of this section, so we keep only assumptions A.1, A.2 and
A.3.
Generally, the contracting parties could commit (through a public announcement) to
a price (or transfer) “rule” q(k) and a renegotiation probability “rule” ρ(k) as a function
of the number of claim holders k who choose to participate in this renegotiation process.
Let M [q(k), ρ(k)] be mechanism which allows the parties to commit to q(k) and ρ(k)
at t = 2+. Participating in this mechanism is an effective way for a claim holder to
tender her claim, since she gives up the rights conferred by it. Therefore, one can think
4Note that, even though τ implicitly depends on q, the maximum value of (7) is ui(x
∗,m∗i ), irre-
spectively of the effect of q on τ .
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of q(k) as the aggregate transfer that a claim holder receives from participating in the
mechanism plus the value of the renegotiated claim. Such a mechanism needs to be
incentive compatible and individual rational.
Incentive compatibility means that the claim holders prefer to participate:
n−1∑
k=0
ul[ml + q(k + 1)]f(k) ≥
n−1∑
k=0
[ρ(k)ul(ml + C) + [1− ρ(k)]ul(ml)]f(k) (8)
The left hand side of (8) is the expected payoff of participating conditional on the
other claim holders participating with probability τ = 1 while the right hand side
of (8) is the expected payoff of not participating conditional the other claim holders
participating. The individual rationality conditions for the claim holders and for the
contracting parties, conditional on τ = 1, are respectively:
n−1∑
k=0
ul[ml + q(k + 1)]f(k) ≥ ul(ml) (9)
n∑
k=n
[
ρ(k)up[x,mp − βpkq(k)] + [1− ρ(k)]up[x∗,m∗p − βpkq(k)]
]
f(k) ≥
up(x
∗,m∗p) (10)
The above conditions apply to the case of “simple” claims of section 3.2, where a
claim holder receives a fixed payment C only on the event of renegotiation. Therefore,
the optimal mechanism M∗ is the one that maximizes the utility of both contracting
parties conditional on satisfying the above conditions. Under this more general ap-
proach on the bargaining between the parties and claim holders, simple claims may not
lead to a zero probability of renegotiation as they did in the previous section.
However, more complex claims, where the value of the exercised claim depends
on the potential participation of other claim holders in M [q(k), ρ(k)], can circumvent
this concern. Specifically, consider the following “complex” claims, which contain two
clauses. (1) “No renegotiation” clause: if i and j renegotiate the original contract κ∗
then the claim holder receives the right to demand compensation C from them. This is
the same as the clause of the simple claims of section 3.2. (2) “No participation” clause:
for any public mechanism M [q(k), ρ(k)] that i and j propose, if a claim holder chooses
not to participate in it, then she receive the right to demand compensation C from
each of the claim holders who decide to participate in M [q(k), ρ(k)]. In other words,
if a claim holder l decides to participate in the renegotiation mechanism M [q(k), ρ(k)]
(effectively tendering her claim) and receives payment q(k), then a claim holder d who
decides not to participate in M [q(k), ρ(k)] (not tender) can demand a payment C from
l at t = 4.
Here, we are assuming that the mechanism itself and the participants are verifiable
in courts, which is the case, since M [q(k), ρ(k)] generates an enforceable agreement.
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Moreover, because at t = 2 the contracting parties do not know who holds the claims,
they can only contact the claim holders through a public announcement and therefore
the mechanism M [q(k), ρ(k)] cannot be secret.
We now show that the “complex” claims change the incentives of claim holders
entirely. In fact, no claim holder would find it profitable to participate. To see this,
suppose that a claim holder l believes that there are n claim holders in total and out of
them k other claim holders choose to participate and d choose not to, with k+d = n−1.
Then, if l does not participate she receives payoff:
ul(τ = 0) = ρ(k)ul[ml + C + kC] + [1− ρ(k)]ul[ml + kC] (11)
While, if l participates she receives payoff:
ul(τ = 1) = ul[ml + q(k + 1)− dC] (12)
The first expression above comes from the fact that, if l does not participate, she
receives the right to ask for the payment C from each of the k claim holders that
participated, while the second expression comes from the fact that, if l participates, she
needs to pay C to each of the d claim holders who did not participate. Note that, as
we also showed in section 3.2, q(k) < C for any value of k, otherwise at least one of the
contracting parties’ individual rationality constraint is violated due to A.3.
Incentive compatibility for l requires that (11) ≥ (12). But if k + d = n − 1 ≥ 1,
this is impossible. If k = 0 and d = n− 1, then ul[ml] > ul[ml + q(k + 1)− (n− 1)C]
so (11) < (12) for any value of ρ(k). If k = n− 1 and d = 0, then ul[ml + (n− 1)C] >
ul[ml + q(k + 1)] and (11) < (12) for any value of ρ(k) again. Generally, if k + d ≥ 1,
then ul[ml + kC] > ul[ml + q(k + 1)− dC] and l’s incentive compatibility is impossible
to hold. In other words, as long as l knows that there exists at least one more claim
holder apart from her (n > 1), it is a strictly dominant strategy for l not to participate
in M [q(k), ρ(k)]. This result requires the weak assumption that the minimum number
of distributed claims is greater than one, which is consistent with the previous section.
Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 1 If the “complex” claims with the “no renegotiation” and the “no participa-
tion” clauses are used, then (a) any mechanism M [q(k), ρ(k)] is not incentive compati-
ble and (b) both the original contract between the contracting parties and the financial
claims on it are renegotiated with probability zero.
Part (a) of the theorem follows from the analysis above. For part (b), since no claim
holders participate in M [q(k), ρ(k)], then all the external claims remain outstanding and
therefore the contracting parties choose to not renegotiate. This means that the results
of the previous section go through even if the mechanism design approach is adopted.
Note that, as mentioned above, the intention of the contracting parties to rene-
gotiate the claims needs to be made publicly known, because they do not know who
the claim holders are. This avoids the possibility of secret mechanisms. And because
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renegotiating the claims generates an enforceable agreement, those who decided not
to participate can verify who participated (signed the new agreement). Therefore, the
claim holders who decide to participate in such a mechanism cannot avoid the pay-
ment demanded by those who did not participate. This renders the claims themselves
renegotiation-proof and blocks at the same time the possibility of renegotiation by the
contracting parties.
4 Hidden Renegotiation and Side Contracting
Another possibility for the contracting parties to avoid paying the claim holders and
to renegotiate the original contract is by conducting hidden renegotiations between
themselves, possibly with the involvement of third parties other than the claim holders,
as Hart and Moore (1999) suggest. These side-contracts may either replace the origi-
nal contract entirely or they may describe a set of actions and transfers such that in
combination with κ∗ they imply that effectively contract κ is implemented. And it is
reasonable to assume that the claim holders cannot observe the hidden renegotiation
process or, even if they could, they cannot prove in courts that it concerns the contract
κ∗ because of the involvement of other parties.
In this section we examine the above arguments formally and we claim that as
long as court hearings are open to public, then hidden renegotiation can be prevented
from taking place. The main reasoning is that hidden side-contracting produces a
new contractual agreement among i, j and possibly some third parties. Each party
complies with it, only because of the fear that the other parties will take it to courts
if it reneges on its promises. But since the contracting party can prove in courts that
the combination of the hidden contract with κ∗ violates its original desire at t = 0
not to renegotiate κ∗, then this is enough to trigger the claims. And as long as the
claims include a clause which rewards the party who reneged on the hidden contracts
and punishes those who took it to the courts, then the hidden contracts become non-
enforceable and any hidden renegotiation attempt fails to take place. We formalize this
reasoning below.
As in previous sections, κ∗ denotes the ex-ante optimal contract and κ the ex-post
optimal contract chosen by i and j. We continue to use the term “contracting party/-
ies” to refer to i and j and the term “claim holders” to refer to the bearers of the claims
issued by i and j. In addition, i and j may sign a hidden side-contract with the possible
involvement of “third-parties”, which we assume to be different intermediaries from the
claim holders. Let P h be the set of all possible third parties that engage with i and j in
hidden renegotiations and let Kh be the set of all possible hidden contracts that they
may sign. κˆ denotes a contract in Kh and h denotes a contracting third party in P h.
For i and j, we assume that the side contracts are designed so that if they are
executed along with κ∗ then they generate the same final outcome as κ.5 Therefore, the
5The arguments of this section also apply to the case where the side-contract contract replaces the
initial contract κ∗ entirely.
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contracting parties ex-post payoff by executing κˆ and κ∗ is equal to up(x(s),mp(s)|y, s)
for p ∈ {i, j}. Moreover, since κˆ implies a vector (xˆ(s), mˆ(s)) of verifiable actions
and final endowments (after transfers are made) for all parties involved in the hidden
renegotiations, then uh(xˆ(s), mˆh(s)|y, s) is third party’s h ex-post payoff if κˆ is executed,
while uh(xˆ
−p(s), mˆ−ph (s)|y, s) stands for h’s payoff when party p ∈ {i, j} reneges on its
promises in κˆ but all other parties fulfil their promises, in which case {xˆ−p(s), mˆ−p(s)}
is the final outcome reached. Finally, let Cˆ be a net transfer such that for any κˆ(s) =
{xˆ(s), mˆ(s)} in Kh the following conditions are satisfied:
up(x
∗(s),m∗p(s)|y, s) ≥ up(x(s),mp(s)− Cˆ|y, s) ∀ y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, κˆ ∈ Kh and p ∈ {i, j}
(13)
up(x
∗(s),m∗p(s) + Cˆ|y, s) ≥ up(x(s),m(s)|y, s) ∀ y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, κˆ ∈ Kh and p ∈ {i, j}
(14)
uh(xˆ
−p(s), mˆ−ph (s)|y, s) ≥ uh(xˆ(s), mˆh(s)− Cˆ|y, s) ∀ y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, κˆ ∈ Kh and h ∈ P h
(15)
In words, Cˆ is designed so that, regardless of which hidden contract is executed, a
contracting party that participates in this contract receives lower payoff than adhering
to κ∗, while the party that adheres to κ∗ receives a higher payoff than the payoff of
the ex-post optimal contract κ. Moreover, any third party h prefers to stay out of the
hidden side contracting process than pay Cˆ and get κˆ implemented.
The timing of events is as follows. As in the previous sections, the parties issue
the claims at t0−. We assume that the claims are “complex” (i.e. they incorporate the
two clauses of subsection 3.3) and on top of that they include an additional “no side-
contracting” clause, which states the following: If (a) any of the contracting parties,
i or j, is taken to court because it reneged on the terms of some contract κˆ, and (b)
the party proves to the court that it reneged on its obligations because complying with
them would imply a different set of outcomes for it than the ones described by κ∗,
then any claim holder reserves the right to demand compensation Cˆ for her and an
additional compensation Cˆ for the party taken to the court from each of the plaintiffs.
Finally, the claim holder has the right to demand these compensations as many times
as needed, as long as conditions (a) and (b) above apply.
The timing of events between t = 0 and t = 3 are the same as in figure 2. In
addition, at t = 3.1 i and j decide whether to sign a hidden side contract κˆ with a
set of third parties P h. We assume that i and j retain a hard copy of this contract.6
At t = 3.2, i, j and the parties in P h decide to uphold the promises that accrue from
the hidden contract or not and at t = 3.3 any of the contracting members may take
the others to court to demand that the contracts are enforced. t = 3.4 is the court
stage, where the defendant provides its evidence and the court decides whether the side
6Any rational individual would demand that she holds a copy of the contracts that she has signed,
otherwise she cannot prove her claims to a court and her rights would become non-enforceable.
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contract is upheld or not. We assume that the court hearings are open to the public.
At t = 3.5 the claim holders observe whether the “no side-contracting” clause applies
and the court’s decision and decide whether to exercise their claims. Finally, at t = 4
the final set of outcomes and payoffs are realized for all players. The overall time-line
is represented in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Timing of Events
At t = 3.5, claim holders decide whether to exercise their claims or not. Regardless
of the courts final decision at t = 3.4, the claim holders always prefer to exercise their
right and receive Cˆ, since conditions (13) and (14) imply that Cˆ > 0. Therefore,
whether claim holders receive Cˆ or not depends on whether the defendant proves that
complying with the hidden contracts violates κ∗ or not.
At the court stage (t = 3.4), the defendant presents its evidence. We denote the
defendant (i.e. the party that reneged on its contractual terms) by d. Because of
condition (14), d prefers to provide the hard evidence and show that κˆ violates its
initial willingness not to renegotiate κ∗ whenever this is the case.
As a result, because of condition (13), the other contracting party does not have
the incentive to take d to the courts and enforce κˆ at t = 3.3. Similarly, because of
condition (15), any third party h prefers not to enforce κˆ than to take d to the courts.
Hence, any contract κˆ becomes effectively non-enforceable. Because of this, at t = 3.2,
it is a dominant strategy for i and j not to execute the promises they gave at t = 3.1,
since they will not be taken to the courts if they renege on them. And at t = 3.1
the contracting parties do not initiate the hidden side-contracting process, since they
anticipate that it will not be enforced anyway. Overall, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2 If the claims issued at t0− include the “no renegotiation” and “no partici-
pation” clauses of section 3.3 and the “no side-contracting” clause of this section, then
the set of hidden side-contracts Kh becomes non-enforceable and the contracting parties
do not take part in any hidden side-contracting at t = 3.1.
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A few notes are required at this point. (a) The claims are conditional on the courts
final decision and the payment Cˆ is made after the courts decision is implemented.
So the claim holders and the defendants have the final say in terms of net transfers.
Therefore, if the hidden renegotiations include a clause that d should pay for Cˆ, then
the exercise of the claims results in d recovering any payment she made back from the
recipients and in receiving Cˆ in addition.
(b) Because the clause allows claim holders to use the claims as many times as d is
taken to courts, any hidden contracting after t = 4 leads to the same result as above.
(c) At the court stage the defendant needs only to prove that complying with both
κ∗ and κˆ implies a different set of final outcomes for it than κ∗ to trigger the clause on
the claims. It does not need to prove that hidden side-contracting took place. While
this makes little difference if there exists only a single side-contract, as is the the case of
the above analysis, it is important for the case where i and j sign several side-contracts
with third parties. In the latter case, the defendant may be unable to prove that side-
contracting took place since it may have signed contracts only with the third parties,
who act as intermediaries between it and the other contracting party. But it is still
in position to prove that the combinations of contracts it has signed violate its initial
desire to implement {x∗(s),m∗d(s)}. This is an effective way to prove that, as far as it
is concerned, renegotiation has taken place.
5 Other Sources of Renegotiation
The analysis of the previous sections was focused only on the case of renegotiation
due to information revelation and irreversibility. The information revelation happens
at t = 2, when the state of the world becomes public knowledge, but at this point of
time the contracting parties have already make their decisions regarding the actions
y = {yi, yj}. Because these actions are irreversible, the new information regarding
the state may mean that the original contract κ∗ is not optimal any more and so
renegotiation becomes an issue.
We focused on this case because it is one of the most commonly encountered in
contract theory literature. Examples of models that fit this description are Ma (1991),
Fudenberg and Tirole (1990) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1990). Also the literature on
soft-budget constraints can be included in this category, like the papers by Dewatripont
and Maskin (1995), Dewatripont and Roland (2000) and Kornai, Maskin, and Roland
(2003). However, our framework can be easily modified to analyze other sources of
renegotiation while retaining the main result. We examine some important alternative
sources of renegotiation below.
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5.1 Suboptimal Punishments
In many mechanism design problems it is possible to construct efficient mechanisms
which implement general classes of social choice functions, but the mechanisms may
involve punishments to all the participants, something that is suboptimal and should
be expected to be renegotiated. Because renegotiation undermines the credibility of the
mechanism, some social functions become non-implementable. Examples of this case
include Maskin and Tirole (1999), Maskin and Moore (1999), Segal (1999), Che and
Hausch (1999), Segal and Whinston (2002) and the implementation problem considered
in Evans (2012).
Our proposed solution can used in these models too. Suppose that there exists an
optimal mechanism κ∗, which induces agents to report truthfully their private infor-
mation and which implements efficient outcomes (on the equilibrium path). This is
equivalent to assumption A.1. Now, suppose that κ∗ is not renegotiation-proof, that is
suppose that there is a state of world s and some reports/actions y by the agents (off
equilibrium path), which induce a suboptimal allocation (punishment) {x∗,m∗} by the
mechanism. This means that there exists some other allocation {x,m} which is Pareto
superior to {x∗,m∗}. This is equivalent to assumption A.2.
Nonetheless, as long as there exists at least one player who prefers the outcome
{x∗,m∗} over the outcome {x,m − βpC} (assumption A.3), then our result applies.
Simply let agents issue complex claims, like the ones in section 4, which give claim
holders the right to demand compensation C if κ∗ is renegotiated, i.e. whenever the
outcome {x,m} is implemented instead of outcome {x∗,m∗}.
Note that the state s may be unobservable or non-verifiable in this case, as for
example in the case of the hold-up literature (Maskin and Tirole, 1999; Segal, 1999).
Then the implemented outcomes (x,m) depend only on the message/action vector
y. But since both the action vector y and the implemented outcome are verifiable
themselves, the unobservability (or non-verifiability) of s does not impact the results.
5.2 Time Inconsistent Preferences
Even though this case is not usually considered in the contract theory literature, some
papers have considered the implications of time inconsistent preferences on contract de-
sign. Examples include O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and DellaVigna and Malmendier
(2004). In principle, one could use our model in order to generate a commitment device
for agents who suffer from time-inconsistency problems.
The set-up is actually simpler in this case. Consider a single agent p, who finds
optimal a set of verifiable actions y∗ at t = 0 but due to a preference change at t = 1
she prefers some other set of actions y. If p would like to commit her future self to
action set y∗ then she could achieve this by issuing claims that pay out compensation C
to any claim holder if she undertakes any action other than y∗. The necessary condition
in this case is that at t = 1 p prefers y∗ to y and paying out C, which is the adaptation
of condition A.3 to this case.
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Finally, note that similar arguments can be made for other inconsistency problems,
like the ones that appear in papers regarding the time-inconsistency of policy makers
(Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 1983; Netzer and Scheuer, 2010) or in
the literature on optimal deadlines, which are usually ex-ante optimal commitments but
ex-post suboptimal (Toxvaerd, 2006; Mason and Valimaki, 2008; Bonatti and Horner,
2011).
6 Discussion and Conclusion
6.1 Limited Liability and Renegotiation
The analysis in the previous sections was done under the assumption of unlimited
liability. This means that both the contracting parties and the claim holders have
sufficient wealth to cover the value of the claim (C). This may not be the case in
all applications of interest. However, as long as civil law allows for other types of
punishment (e..g prison) for persons who are unable to pay out all their debts, the
necessary condition for the credibility of the solution can be relaxed.
Specifically, let xˆ(s) denote the set of verifiable actions that are undertaken at t = 4
when contract κ = {x,m} is executed and the contracting parties are punished because
they do not have sufficient wealth to cover the claim value. Then condition A.3 can be
modified to:
• A.5: There exists xˆ(s) such that, for any {βi, βj|βi + βj = 1},
up(x
∗(s),m∗p(s)|y, s) > up(xˆ(s), 0|y, s) for some p ∈ {i, j}
A.5 is weaker than A.3 and, as discussed above, it should be expected to hold
whenever the legal system allows one to be imprisoned for not been able to repay her
debts.
According to section 3.3, claim holders may also be liable for paying out C, if they
have participated in the renegotiation process. However, in these cases limited liability
is not an issue because claim holders do not benefit from the renegotiation directly.
Therefore, their total pledgeable wealth is equal to ml + q(k) (if we assume that k of
them participate). Even if ml + q(k) < C and even if renegotiation does not take place,
those who did not participate find it optimal to seize the total wealth of those who
did. This makes participation in a mechanism suboptimal and, therefore, the limited
liability constraint does not impact the results.
6.2 Positive Issuance Costs
Another implicit assumption of the above analysis is that the cost of issuance of claims
is zero. Clearly this is not the case. Even if the contracting parties issue these claims
in the simplest possible way (they do not use financial markets but issue the claims
themselves), some lawyer fees are probably involved.
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Since these costs take place at the ex-ant stage (before the contracting members
sign any contract), the analysis does not become more involved. As long as the ex-
ante benefit of blocking renegotiation exceeds the cost of issuing the claims, the value
of renegotiation blocking is positive and the above analysis remains valid. Otherwise,
renegotiation cannot be blocked by the proposed method.
However, we should reasonably expect that in most cases of interest issuance costs
are relatively small for two reasons. First, since the contracting parties want to contract
anyway, they can minimize the issuance costs by exploiting the synergies of doing the
claim issuance and signing the contract κα at the same time (e.g. minimizing lawyer
fees). Second, because in most economic transactions where contracts are actually used
the potential benefits of contracting are substantial enough to justify the additional
costs of lawyers’ fees. For example, see Gagnepain, Ivaldi, and Martimort (2013) for a
recent empirical study on the costs of renegotiation (i.e. potential benefits of renegoti-
ation blocking).
6.3 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the conditions under which financial claims can be used
in an effective way to block the renegotiation of contractual agreements. The results
highlight the importance of information regarding the number and identity of claim
holders. We show that if the contracting parties know exactly how many claims have
been issued, then financial claims cannot block renegotiation. But if the contracting
parties do not know exactly how many claims have been issued, then renegotiation
blocking is possible. This may require “complex” claims, with special clauses, like the
“no participation” clause of section 3.3 in order to block general bargaining games
between the claim holders and the contracting parties, or like the “no side-contracting”
clause of section 4 in order to block any hidden side-contracts. Nonetheless, if the
prospect of renegotiation is costly for the contracting parties from an ex-ante point
view, then they should be willing to adopt any credible commitment to block it. In this
paper we show that financial claims can in theory fulfil this role.
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